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LARRY N. HEATH, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SAM L. GALLEGOS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15569 
This is a rear-end collision wherein the appel-
lant's vehicle struck the rear of respondent's vehicle 
on a residential street, and the main issue is whether 
or not the forward motorist was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, sitting without a 
jury, found that the collision was proximately caused by 
the appellant, who was the following driver, and that 
respondent was not negligent, and awarded damages to 
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respondent after dismissing appellant's counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment ren-
dered by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 26th day of December, 1976, a rear-end 
collision occurred in the westbound lane of 1750 North 
in the West 1600 block of Layton City, Utah (T-6). 
The streets were dry, and the weather sunny (T-8). 
Respondent stopped at the "yield" sign at 1575 West and 
then proceeded westbound, attaining a speed of 15 to 
20 m.p.h. in a 25-mile per hour zone (T-30, L.3-5,9). 
Appellant says the speed was 5 to 10 m.p.h., and his 
wife opined the speed to be 10 to 15 m.p.h. (T-58, L. 20; 
T-53, L.4). At the time appellant approached the acci-
dent scene he was overtaking respondent's vehicle and 
honked his horn to get respondent to speed up a little, 
because the appellant was late for church (T-58, L.24, 
26). The respondent didn't know what was going on and 
slowed down (T-58, L.28-30; T-59, L.l). Then appellant 
honked again, and claims that the respondent slammed on 
his brakes. Respondent states he did not make a sudden 
-2-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or emergency type stop, but simply made a normal stop 
(T-31, L.6-8). The investigating officer reported that 
the respondent came to a sudden stop, but under extensive 
cross-examination the officer admitted that he didn't 
know whether or not that report came to him from the 
respondent or the apellant (T-13, L.4-6; T-15, L.l-5) 
Respondent did not represent that he made a rapid stop 
when talking to the investigating officer, but the appel-
lant did so represent (T-31, L.26-30 and T-32, L.l). 
The investigating officer further testified that at the 
time of the collision there were no parked cars on the 
right or north side of the street, and that respondent's 
car was stopped approximately 24 inches from the north 
curb, and that neither car left skid marks (T-10, L.24-
29; T-7, L.8-16). At the accident scene it was the 
appellant who was belligerant and acting out his frus-
trations, and there is no evidence that the respondent 
was anything but cooperative (T-15, L.23). There is 
nothing to indicate that the respondent acted in retali-
ation against the appellant in the causation of this 
collision. The witness Dale Wanner stated that he saw 
the respondent slowing down and that he saw the appellant 
-3-
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simply run .i.nto the rear of the car in front (T-18, L. 27, 
et seq.). Appellant first testified that he had no 
recollection of any cars parked on 1750 North in the area 
of the collision (T-4, L.l7-26). Through the progress 
of the trial, it became apparent that such testimony was 
not in appellant's best interest, and his memory improved 
substantially so that by the end of the trial he testified 
that there were cars on the side of the road, but he 
didn't say which side (T-58, L.28). Nevertheless, appel-
lant's wife testified that there was room to pass on the 
left side after the collision occurred (7-54, L.27), and 
appellant's son testified that there were no oncoming 
cars (T-58, L.l,2). 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED 
BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE. 
Where there is conflicting evidence on any issue, 
it is assumed that the trial court believed those aspecLs 
of the evidence and the testimony that support his find-
ings. Fillmore City v. Reeve (Utah), 571 P.2d 1316 
(1977). Consequently, the facts should be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the ruling of the trial court, 
-4-
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and the findings and judgment should not be disturbed 
when they are based on substantial, competen~, and ad-
missible evidence. Fisher v. Taylor (Utah), 572 P.2d 
393 (1977). Appellant says respondent stopped rapidly, 
and the police officer so indicated in his report. How-
ever, the police officer also testified that he didn't 
know which party his information came from. On the 
other hand, Dale Wanner, appellant, and respondent testi-
fied that the forward vehicle slowed down and then came 
to a stop, and respondent further testified that he 
applied his brakes and stopped after the second honk 
because he thought something might be wrong with his 
vehicle or that the appellant was trying to stop him. 
In Finding No. 4, the court concluded as a ma~ter of 
fact "that plaintiff's stop was not sudden or panicky in 
the sense that the wheels locked or the type of stop 
that would put the defendant in jeopardy had defendant 
not been negligent." 
Appellant testified that respondent was going ex-
tremely slow, and when asked why he didn't pass to the 
left of respondent's vehicle he stated there were parked 
cars on the roadway that prevented such a move. However, 
this testimony from appellant came at the end of the 
-5-
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trial after he had been educated throughout the trial 
as to the significance of cars parked on the street, 
because as the first witness in the trial he testified 
that he had no recollection of cars being parked on the 
street in the vicinity of the collision. Appellant's 
son specifically recalled that there were no oncoming 
cars, and the investigating officer testified that 
there were no cars parked on the right or westbound 
side of the street. Furthermore, appellant's wife 
testified that immediately after the collision occurred 
she passed to the left of the vehicles involved in the 
collision and even came to a stop and adjacent to those 
vehicles. As set forth in Finding No. 2, the court was 
justified in believing that "there were no other cars 
in the immediate vicinity of the collision, either east-
bound or parked on the street". 
Though appellant placed respondent's speed at 5 
to 10 m.p.h., his wife estimated the speed to be higher, 
and respondent estimated his speed to be 15 to 20 m.p.h. 
The court was fully justified in determining in Finding 
No. 3 that respondent's vehicle attained a speed of ap-
proximately 15 m.p.h. prior to the first honk by appellant. 
A fair inference to be drawn is that appellant's speed 
-6-
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was in excess of 15 m.p.h. as it approached the rear of 
respondent's vehicle and honked the first time, and 
when appellant observed that instead of speeding up, the 
respondent slowed down, he had a duty to adjust the 
speed and distance of his car accordingly. But he did 
not do so. Instead, he continued his speed and ap-
proached even closer to the rear of respondent's vehicle, 
and then honked again, and respondent then stopped. If in 
fact there were no parked cars and no oncoming vehicles 
as found by the court, why didn't the appellant simply 
pass as his wife did immediately after the impact? 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S DRIVING, PRIOR TO IMPACT, WAS 
CONSISTENT IVITH THE TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULA-
TIONS OF TITLE 41, CHAPTER 6, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED. 
All of the witnesses, including appellant, agree 
that respondent slowed down before he stopped his ve-
hicle, and the investigating officer estim~ted respondent's 
vehicle came to a stop approxinately 24 inches from the 
north curb. 41-6-SS(b), U.C.A. 1953, as amended, pro-
vides: 
Except when overtaking and passing on the 
right is permitted, the driver of an over-
-7-
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taken vehicle shall give way to the right 
in favor of the overtaking vehicle on 
audible signal and shall not increase the 
speed of his vehicle until completely passed 
by the overtaking vehicle. 
Appellant admits that he was the overtaking ve-
hicle, and his wife's testimony shows there was ample 
room to pass on the left of respondent, and there were 
no oncoming vehicles, according to appellant's son. 
Upon the first sound of the horn, respondent was fully 
justified in assuming the vehicle approaching from the 
rear would pass, because his vehicle was over toward the 
right side of the westbound lane of traffic, and he did 
not increase his speed but rather decreased it as an 
accomodation to the car approaching from the rear. At 
the second sound of appellant's horn, respondent brought 
his vehicle to a stop. On the other hand, it was the 
duty of the appellant to comply with the provisions of 
41-6-62(a), U.C.A. 1953 as follows: 
The driver of a motor vehicle shall not 
follow another vehicle more closely than 
is reasonable and prudent, having due 
regard for the speed of such vehicles 
and the traffic upon and the condition of 
the highway. 
It was obvious to the appellant after the first 
honk that respondent was slowing down, and he had a 
duty to adjust the speed and distance of his vehicle 
-8-
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accordingly, but instead he simply proceeded closer to 
the rear of respondent's vehicle and honked again. When 
appellant failed to pass after the first honk, respondent 
checked his rear view mirror, found out who it was honking 
at him, and became justly apprehensive and brought his 
vehicle to a stop. In his brief appellant admits that 
tail lights actuated by the brake pedal may be consid-
ered an adequate signal, as provided at 41-6-70, U.C.A. 
1953. The fact that respondent's vehicle slowed down 
after the first honk as admitted by appellant is some 
evidence that an appropriate signal was given before 
the forward vehicle was brought to a stop, and appellant 
observed that fact in sufficient time to make the adjust-
ments that would have avoided the collision, and such is 
his burden and duty. Kight v. Butscher, 90 N.M. 386, 
564 P.2d 189 (1977); Apato v. BeMac Transport Co., 7 
Ill.App.3d 1099, 288 N.E.2d 683 (1972). 
But even if, contrary to the finding of the trial 
court, there was a sudden decrease in the speed of re-
spondent's vehicle without any brake lights or signal 
of any kind and a decrease is actually observed by the 
appellant (as in this case) , he has the same notice that 
-9-
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any signal would have imparted if given, and therefore 
the failure of the respondent to give such a signal is 
not a proximate cause of the collision. Hallett v. 
Stone, 216 Kan. 568, 534 P. 2d 232 ( 1975) 
Therefore, the admissions of the appellant con-
stitute the strongest kind of evidence against him. 
Whether he perceived the decrease in speed by brake 
lights, by a closing of the space between the vehicles, 
or by some other means is unimportant. The fact that 
he did perceive it is extremely important, because a 
signal froM the respondent would have given him no 
better notice than he already had from his own observation, 
and appellant connects the slowing of the speed to the 
honk he himself gave. In speaking to this exact point, 
the court said in Curtiss v. Fahle, 157 Kan. 226, 139 
P.2d 827: 
Where the sudden decrease in the speed of a 
vehicle is actually observed without a signal, 
the party observing the decrease in speed 
has the same notice a signal would have 
imparted if given at that time, and the ab-
sence of a signal cannot be said to have 
been the proximate cause of the collision. 
It is the general law of the road that a driver 
approaching from the rear has a duty to keep a safe 
lookout to avoid colliding with the vehicle ahead, and 
-10-
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he must take into account the prospects of having to 
stop his car suddenly. Glen v. Mosley, 39 Ill.App.3d 
172, 350 N.E.2d 219 (1976); Kight v. Butscher, supra. 
Recognition of this general rule was given by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Bullock v. Ungricht (Utah), 538 P.2d 
190, 191 (1975): 
In preface to our analysis of the plaintiff's 
contentions, we acknowledge our agreement that 
in most cases where one car "rear ends" another 
it accords with common sense and experience to 
believe that the following car has disregarded 
the duty to keep a lookout ahead and keep the 
car under control and is, therefore, at fault. 
CONCLUSION 
Where the evidence is in conflict on any issue, 
the trier of fact is the final arbiter. Appellant has 
the burden of proving that there was a sudden stop or 
decrease in speed, and failed to convince the trial court 
of that fact. Therefore, the requirements of 41-6-69(c), 
U.C.A., do not apply. But even if a signal was required, 
a signal was given, and appellant acknowledges that he 
received the signal because he testified that the forward 
vehicle slowed down after appellant's first honk. Being 
conscious that the vehicle in front was slowing, appellant's 
awareness of that fact would not have been enhanced by 
-11-
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any additional or other kind of signal given by respon-
dent. Appellant had a golden opportunity to pass re-
spondent's vehicle, but instead appellant consciously 
chose to honk his horn to encourage respondent to in-
crease his speed. But respondent, not knowing that 
appellant was not going to pass, reacted oppositely by 
staying at the extrerae right edge of the roadway and 
slowing his speed, and then finally determined that he 
would stop after the second honk. After the first honk, 
surely appellant must have known that respondent may 
~nterpret a second honk as a requirement to pull over 
and stop. The respondent had a right to be uncertain 
and confused, and to bring his vehicle to a normal stop 
without further notice to the appellant. 
The judgment of the lower court should be sus-
tained and the appeal dismissed. 
1978. 
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 
BEAN, BEAN & SMEDLEY 
·. / /.'_{_/. 
~;:<C:d/~~~,4/ / __ 
dA E. BEAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
190 So. Fort Lane 
Layton, Utah 84041 
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